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United States Court of Federal Claims 
 
System Fuels, Inc. v. United States, Nuclear Reg. Rep. 
P. 20,761, No. 03-2621C, 2016 WL 537617 (Fed. Cl. 
Feb. 10, 2016). 
 
Several nuclear energy companies (Plaintiffs) filed suit 
against the United States alleging that the Department 
of Energy (DOE) breached the Standard Contract that 
each entered into with DOE outlining the disposal of 
nuclear fuel. At issue was the DOE’s breach of a 1983 
Standard Contract for the disposal of spent nuclear fuel 
and/or high level radioactive waste, which specifically 
dealt with those who generated or held title to high-
level radioactive waste or spent nuclear fuel of 
domestic origin. The Government was found liable for 
partial breach of contract, and the only issue before the 
Court of Federal Claims was the amount of damages 
owed to Plaintiffs. The Court of Federal Claims made a 
number of findings regarding monetary recovery and 
held that Plaintiffs should recover damages for their dry 
fuel storage project, including salaries of employees on 
that project. The final award to Plaintiffs was in the 
amount of $49,403,339. 
 
District of Columbia Circuit 
 
Xcel Energy Servs. Inc. v. F.E.R.C., No. 14-1282, 2016 
WL 874746 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 8, 2016).  
 
Power Company appeals orders from Regulatory 
Commission, which ultimately denied the Power 
Company refunds from a rate schedule that it deemed 
unfair. The Regulatory Commission had allowed a tariff 
revision filed by the Southwest Power Pool (SPP) to 
take effect without suspension or a voluntary refund 
commitment, despite the Power Company raising 
material issues and complaints about the tariff rate. The 
rise of a material issue warranted a Section 205 Review 
of the Federal Power Act regarding the tariff rate, 
which was not granted. When the Power Company filed 
for a rehearing, during which the Regulatory 
Commission found it had erred as a matter of law, but 
that it lacked any jurisdiction to retroactively refund the 
rates. Regulatory Commission therefore asked the SPP 
to file either a removal of the tariff or a refund of the 
rates starting on February 22, 2013. Power Company 
appealed the Regulatory Commission’s order stating 
that as no extensive Section 205 Review was completed 
prior to the implementation of the tariff, a retroactive 
refund should be deemed both necessary and proper. 
The Circuit Court ultimately agreed with the Power 
Company, therefore remanding the case so the 







Lindauer v. Williams Production RMT Co., 2016 
COA 39 (Colo. App. 2016). 
 
Lessors leased their mineral rights to Company 
retaining a leasehold royalty interest. Company 
produced gas from the mineral estate and incurred 
costs for compressing, gathering, and processing the 
gas. Company did not deduct any of the costs that 
accrued from the gas until it reached the “tailgate” of 
a processing plant, where it entered into the mainline 
pipeline and reached its first commercial market 
location. Prior to Company’s production of the gas, it 
entered into long-term contracts with pipeline 
companies so it could reserve capacity on the 
mainline pipeline to transport the gas to downstream 
markets where it could obtain higher sale prices of 
the gas. Company subsequently deducted the costs it 
incurred transporting the gas from the “tailgate” to 
the downstream markets from Lessors’ royalty. 
Lessors brought suit, alleging that the Company may 
only be allowed to deduct those costs if it can show 
that the costs are reasonable and that their “royalty 
revenues increase in proportion with the costs 
assessed against the royalties” on a month-by-month 
basis. Company alternatively argued that the only test 
that should be applied is the “prudent operator rule.” 
This rule examines Company’s overall 
reasonableness in entering into these long-term 
contracts to determine whether the contracts benefit 
both Company and Lessors more than selling the gas 
at the “tailgate” or the place of first marketability. 
The Colorado Appellate Court agreed with Company 
and found that transportation costs incurred after the 
gas reached the “tailgate” are deductible if those 
costs are reasonable. Additionally, the Court found 
that Company was not required to show that those 
costs either increased Lessors’ royalties or enhanced 
the value of the gas. 
 
Rocky Mountain Expl., Inc. v. Davis Graham & 
Stubbs LLP, 2016 COA 33 (Colo. App. 2016). 
 
Mineral Sellers appealed the Colorado District 
Court’s order granting Law Firm’s motion for 
http://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/onej/vol1/iss6/5
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summary judgment. Mineral Sellers sold oil and gas 
interest to Lario Oil and Gas Company (Lario), who 
served as an agent for Tracker, an unidentified principal 
in the transaction. Tracker was also Law Firm’s client. 
Seller alleged that Law Firm: (1) engaged in a civil 
conspiracy to use agent buyer as a strawman purchaser, 
(2) aided and abetted agent’s and principal’s breach of 
fiduciary duty, (3) tortiously interfered with Seller’s 
business expectancy, (4) aided and abetted fraud, (5) 
engaged in conspiracy to commit fraud, and (6) 
committed fraud. The Colorado Court of Appeals 
affirmed the lower court’s decisions and held that the 
(1) agent, principal, and Law Firms’ scheme to 
purchase Mineral Seller’s oil and gas interest through 
use of strawman did not amount to fraudulent conduct; 
(2) purchase and sale agreement’s creation of an area of 
mutual interest did not create a joint venture, thus no 
fiduciary interest between seller, purchasing agent, and 
its principal; (3) Mineral Seller’s assertion that the Law 
Firms misled Mineral Seller and its joint venture 
partners into believing the Law Firms were acting 
solely as legal counsel to agent, stated a claim for 
fraudulent nondisclosure rather than affirmative fraud; 
(4) seller failed to allege that Law Firms had a duty to 
disclose that it represented only undisclosed principal, 
as required to state a claim for affirmative fraud, civil 
conspiracy to commit fraud, and aiding and abetting 
fraud; (5) seller could not have relied on law firm’s 
alleged failure to disclose that it represented only agent 




St. Tammany Parish Government v. Welsh, No. 2015 
CA 1152, 2016 WL 918361 (La. App. 1 Cir. 2016). 
 
In 2010, the Parish completed a rezoning process of 
unincorporated areas within its boundaries. In 2014, the 
Louisiana State Commissioner approved a drilling and 
production permit to explore for and produce oil and 
gas on land located within the Parish. The Parish filed 
suit against the Commissioner alleging that such a 
permit regarding the land within their rezoning area was 
an unconstitutional preemption of local power. The 
Appellate Court found that Louisiana state law 
preempted the Parish’s zoning laws because the clear 
language of state law demonstrates the legislature’s 
intent to preempt any local area of law that affects the 
State’s regulation of its oil and gas activity. In addition, 
the Parish also argued that the Commissioner did not 
consider its master plan before proceeding with activity 
that affected the Parish’s plan. The Court found that the 
Commissioner did address and consider the Parish’s 
plans before going through with the exploration and 
production process. Therefore, the Appellate Court held 
that the Commissioner may proceed with the 
exploration and production unit zoned within the 
boundaries of the Parish. 
 
Regions Bank v. Questar Exploration & Production 
Corp., 184 So.3d 260 (La. Ct. App. 2 Cir. 2016). 
 
In what began as an action against an exploration and 
production company for the failure to develop 
mineral leases, mineral rights owners later amended 
their petition to ask the court to declare that the leases 
in question had terminated. A Louisiana statute 
provided that leases that contain terms extending 
beyond 99 years are invalid. The trial court, holding 
the statute was inapplicable to the leases, entered 
summary judgment in favor of Lessors, and the 
mineral rights owners appealed. The Court of Appeal 
affirmed the trial court’s decision, holding that since 
the judgment certification defects were cured by the 
trial court and resulted in proper certification, the 
Court of Appeal did indeed have jurisdiction to 
review partial summary judgment. Moreover, they 
also held that the leases were not perpetual in nature, 
and therefore not void from the beginning as against 





Ward v. Harrell, 2015-CA-00101-COA, 2016 WL 
703099 (Miss. Ct. App. Feb. 23, 2016). 
 
Ward and Harrell each claimed ownership of the 
mineral estate under a tract of land now owned by 
Ward (Subject Tract). The chancery court reformed 
the deed to quiet title to the minerals in Harrell, 
reasoning that a prior deed was ambiguous. The court 
of appeals affirmed, but based its ruling on mutual 
mistake and scrivener’s error rather than finding 
ambiguity. Harrell, Ward’s predecessor-in-interest to 
the Subject Tract, had previously conveyed the 
Subject Tract to Martin by warranty deed which 
stated, “[t]he Grantee herein retains all mineral rights 
on said land and property.” Martin conveyed the 
Subject Tract to Ward by warranty deed excepting all 
minerals in and under the Subject Tract “which have 
been previously reserved or conveyed.” Both Ward 
and Harrell subsequently granted oil and gas leases 
covering the Subject Tract. The court determined that 
actions taken by Harrell prior to the conveyance to 
Martin, including granting three oil and gas leases 
and correcting the legal description, coupled with the 
lack of any indication that Martin ever attempted to 
claim the mineral estate and later granted the Subject 
Tract to Ward “subject to” the prior reservation, 
satisfied the relevant evidentiary standard of proving 
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2016
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Wicklund v. Sundheim, 2016 MT 62 (Mont. 2016). 
 
Grantors conveyed real property to Grantees in a 1953 
Warranty Deed, which included a 3/5ths reservation in 
the mineral interests and a 3/5ths reservation of any and 
all delay rentals. Prior to this deed, Grantors’ 
predecessors conveyed an oil and gas lease on certain 
portions of the land to a third party, but the lease 
expired in 1958. The issue presented on appeal was 
whether the reservation language in the 1953 warranty 
deed terminated when the third party lease expired in 
1958, thus placing all of the royalty interests in 
Grantees after that date. The Supreme Court of 
Montana held that the warranty deed was ambiguous 
and found that the lower court erred when it did not 
consider the extrinsic evidence presented by Grantors to 
resolve the ambiguity. Specifically, the Court held that 
because both parties signed a Communitization 
Agreement almost two decades after the 1958 deed 
expired, Grantees voluntary acknowledged that they 
were aware of Grantors’ continuing mineral interest in 
the property at issue. Thus, the Court found that 
Grantees’ conduct supported Grantors’ argument that a 
3/5ths royalty reservation in the 1953 warranty deed did 
not terminate when the third party lease expired in 
1958. Furthermore, the Court found that the lower court 
erred when it held that the doctrine of laches applied, 
denying Grantors’ claim to their 3/5ths royalty due to 
the length of time that elapsed before Grantors brought 
suit to confirm their royalty interests. Instead, the 
Supreme Court found that the evidence asserted a 
perpetual royalty interest each time there was new oil 
and gas development on the property. Therefore, the 
Court found that the Grantors were entitled to a 3/5ths 
royalty interest in the property at issue as reserved in 
the 1953 warranty deed.  
 
Interstate Explorations, LLC v. Morgen Farm and 
Ranch, Inc., 2016 MT 20 (Mont. 2016). 
 
An exploration company that had been leasing mineral 
rights from a farm and ranch estate brought declaratory 
action against the estate, alleging the estate was wrong 
in denying the company access to essential easements 
that would allow them to install a power line to operate 
the well drilled on property. The estate counterclaimed 
and sought monetary damages for an alleged 
hydrocarbon spill. The district court denied lessee's 
motion to dismiss counterclaims, which asserted that 
the lessor failed to first exhaust administrative remedies 
before initiating legal action for damages. The Supreme 
Court of Montana affirmed the lower court, holding 
that the remedies available under the Surface Damage 
Act are expressly stated—within the Act itself—as 
not being exclusive and exist as an attempt to 
facilitate communication to resolve damage disputes. 
Since they are not to be used as an agency or 
administrative proceeding that must be exhausted 
before litigation may be commenced, the estate was 
not required to pursue this remedy before litigating 




In re Sabine Oil & Gas Corp., 62 Bankr. Ct. Dec. 78 
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y 2016).  
 
Debtor, an independent energy company, filed for 
Chapter 11 Bankruptcy. Before the United States 
Bankruptcy Court was Debtor’s motion for an order 
authorizing rejection of certain executory contracts 
between Oil & Gas Corporation (Corporation) and 
Gas Gatherer as well as between Corporation and 
Holding Company. Corporation became party to two 
contracts with Gas Gatherer, a gas gathering 
agreement and condensate gathering agreement 
(collectively, Gathering Agreements). Corporation 
also became party to two contracts with Holding 
Company, a production gathering, treating and 
processing agreement and a water and acid gas 
handling agreement (collectively, Processing 
Agreements). Each of these agreements were 
governed by Texas law. The Court found the Debtor 
satisfied the standard, “whether a reasonable business 
person would make a similar decision under similar 
circumstances,” for the rejection of the agreements. 
However, both Gas Gatherer and Holding Company 
objected to Debtor’s proposed rejection arguing that 
Corporation’s contractual covenants “run with the 
land.” A covenant runs with the land when: (1) it 
touches/concerns the land; (2) it relates to a thing in 
existence or specifically binds the parties and their 
assigns; (3) it is intended by the original parties to 
run with the land; and (4) the successor to the burden 
has notice. The covenants at issue did not appear to 
satisfy the “touch and concern” prong since the 
covenant must (a) burden the promisor’s legal 
interest in the land to touch and concern that land, 
and (b) it must still affect the owner’s interest in the 
property or its use. Here, Debtor did not reserve any 
interest for Gas Gatherer nor Holding Company, 
rather they simply engaged in certain services. The 
Court’s conclusion that the covenants at issue did not 
run with the land is non-binding, but the Court 
granted the motion finding that Debtor’s decision to 
reject each of the Gathering and Processing 
http://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/onej/vol1/iss6/5
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Kittleson v. Grynberg Petroleum Co., 2016 ND 44 
(N.D. 2016). 
 
Mineral Lessee appealed from a lower court decision 
that interpreted a no-deductions clause, calculated 
damages for breach of that clause, and applied a ten-
year statute of limitations to the action to recover by 
Mineral Lessor. The North Dakota Supreme Court 
affirmed the lower court’s decision. The royalty clause 
called for payment to Lessor of “the market value at the 
well for all gas . . . produced from the leased 
premises . . .; provided however, that there shall be no 
deductions [for post-production costs].” While the “at 
the well” language allows deduction of reasonable post-
production costs from the sales price received, the more 
specific “no deductions language qualifies and prevails 
over [the at the well clause].” The court applied a ten-
year statute of limitations and awarded Lessor damages 
of approximately $17,240 for improper royalty 
deductions from 1997 to 2009, plus interest, attorney’s 
fees, and costs. Lessor was found not to have severed 
the gas from his property before it was sold and 
therefore was not a “seller” under the Uniform 
Commercial Code. Thus, the ten-year statute of 
limitations was appropriately applied due to its 





Spartan Texas Capital Partners, Ltd. v. Perryman, No. 
14–14–00873–CV, 2016 WL 796073 (Tex. App. Mar. 
1, 2016). 
  
Mineral Owners brought suit against Exploration 
Company, which then brought a third-party action 
against purported Royalty Interest Holders. Mineral 
Owners settled their disputes with Exploration 
Company out of court. Mineral Owners then claimed 
that Royalty Interest Holders failed to mention any 
prior conveyances of a one-half royalty interest in 
various deed conveyances, and thus were estopped from 
claiming a one-half royalty interest in the property. 
Mineral Owners further claimed that one of the Royalty 
Interest Holders, Perryman, failed to disclose an 
inherited interest in the subject property when he filed 
for bankruptcy. The lower court ruled in favor of 
Royalty Interest Holders, and Mineral Owners appealed 
the decision. The Appellate Court held that the Royalty 
Interest Holders conveyed their entire royalty interest 
and were estopped from claiming a royalty interest 
under the Duhig doctrine. Subsequently, the 
Appellate Court rejected Mineral Owner’s judicial 
estoppel claim because Perryman had no motive for 
concealment during bankruptcy, and the failure to 
disclose his royalty interest occurred more than 25 
years prior to the present suit. In addition, the 
Appellate Court concluded that Royalty Interest 
Holders are not barred from claiming a one-fourth 
royalty interest in the land inherited from their 
father’s estate.  
 
Burlington Resources Oil & Gas Co., LP v. Petromax 
Operating Co., No. 06-15-00044-CV, 2016 WL 
908228 (Tex. App. Mar. 10, 2016). 
 
In 1975, predecessors of Purported Interest Holder 
entered into an agreement by which they would 
receive a 25% interest in nine existing leasehold 
areas. The agreement provided that the if either 
company were to acquire land within an Area of 
Mutual Interest (AMI), then the same offer should be 
made such that Purported Interest Holder would 
receive a 25% share in the lease and the other 
company a 75% share in the lease. In 1978, Purported 
Interest Holder entered into a farmout agreement with 
Operators’ predecessor for portions of the leases after 
oil and gas were found within the land. In 1994, 
Purported Interest Holder entered into an assignment 
and bill of sale for its remaining interest in most of its 
leases, including the one in question. In 2007, an 
examination of title search performed by Operators 
found that Purported Interest Holder still retained an 
interest in the land. In the years between 2007 and 
2012, Operators offered Purported Interest Holder an 
opportunity to participate in joint ventures on the 
properties, in which Purported Interest Holder did 
occasionally participate. In 2012, an examination of 
title determined that Purported Interest Holder did not 
own any interest in lease in question, and therefore 
was sent a reimbursement check for expenses it had 
incurred in drilling the most recent well. Purported 
Interest Holder filed suit stating that it still owned a 
mineral interest underlying the property, based on the 
1994 agreement. The lower court granted summary 
judgment in favor of the Defendant, stating that the 
1994 agreement was unambiguous and that Purported 
Interest Holder had sold all its interest in the lease in 
question. On appeal, the Appellate Court agreed with 
the lower court’s reasoning and affirmed the 
decision.  
 
Oncor Electric Delivery Company LLC v. Chaparral 
Energy, L.L.C., Util. L. Rep. P 27, 334 (Tex. App. 
2016). 
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Alleging that an electric utility company breached a 
contract regarding the extension and construction of 
equipment necessary to provide electricity to two oil 
wells, an independent oil and gas production company 
filed suit for damages and attorney’s fees. The district 
court entered judgment on a jury verdict in favor of the 
oil and gas production company. On appeal, the utility 
company argued that the breach was one of implied 
warranty. The Court of Appeals was not persuaded by 
this argument, noting that the utility company failed to 
object to this issue at trial. The Court of Appeals held 
that the terms of the agreement and the more 
specifically worded tariff were where the breach 
occurred. Further, the court held that the damages 
awarded to the oil and gas production company did not 
violate the tariff's limitation of liability since there can 
be no interruption of services—one of the limiting 





















































United States Court of Federal Claims 
 
Pioneer Reserve, LLC v. United States, 125 Fed. Cl. 
112 (2016). 
 
Corporation formed for the express purpose of 
preserving a wetlands habitat filed suit against the 
United States, claiming the United States’ Army Corps 
of Engineers breached an Umbrella Mitigation Banking 
Instrument (UMBI). The instrument was intended to be 
purchasable by third parties to function as credits that 
would offset environmental damage committed by the 
third-party. Corporation filed a motion for summary 
judgment for the UMBI to be considered a legally 
binding contract. Furthermore, Corporation claimed the 
Army Corps unilaterally amended the number of credits 
involved in the UMBI and failed to properly reimburse 
Corporation for the credits. The United States also filed 
a motion for summary judgment, alleging that the 
credits were purely speculative in nature and no 
damages were actually incurred. The United States 
Court of Federal Claims determined that a contract 
existed, but that questions of fact remained to determine 
if Corporation consented to the amendments and 
whether it suffered any damages. Because questions of 
material fact remained, the Court refused to grant 






Monterey Peninsula Water Management Dist. v. Public 
Utilities Com., 364 P.3d 404 (Cal. 2016). 
 
A regional California water district (District) assessed 
an extra fee on a public water utility company’s 
(Company) customers to help fund an environmental 
impact mitigation program. The extra fee was included 
in the Company’s customer bills. The Commission, a 
regulatory agency with legislative authority to regulate 
rates of public utility companies, denied the Company’s 
request to maintain the fee system in place, questioning 
the system’s cost-effectiveness. The District requested a 
writ of review from the California Supreme Court. The 
Commission argued that the fees in question should be 
viewed as a surcharge by the Company, rather than a 
government fee, thus allowing it to regulate the fee. The 
Court found that the Commission had no legislative 
authority to regulate fees set by state agencies, 
including the District. Because the fee ultimately 
originated with the District, the Court set aside the 
Commission’s decision, remanding it for rehearing. 
 
Newhall County Water District v. Castaic Lake 
Water Agency, 197 Cal. Rptr. 3d 429 (Cal. Ct. App. 
2016) 
 
A county water district and purveyor (District), 
brought suit for writ of mandate against a state water 
agency (Agency), challenging its new rate structure 
for water provided to the districts. The District 
claimed that the new rates, assessed based on the 
districts’ total water use rather than the volume of 
water imported, violated state laws, including 
California State Proposition 26, requiring such rates 
to be proportionate to burdens and benefits of the 
service and related to reasonable costs of providing 
the service. The lower court granted the mandate, and 
the Agency appealed. The California Court of 
Appeals for the 2nd District affirmed the lower 
court’s judgment. The Court held that the Agency’s 
fees were not proportionate or reasonable because it 
was charging for services (non-imported 
groundwater) it did not provide, as well as 
groundwater planning activities that benefitted the 
region as a whole, not purely the districts affected by 




Rangen, Inc. v. Idaho Dept. of Water Resources, No. 
42772, 2016 WL 768152 (Idaho Feb. 29, 2016). 
 
A Fish Hatchery Operator (Operator) contended that 
Junior Water Rights Holders (Rights Holders) were 
infringing on its ground water supply. Operator 
sought for the Director of the Idaho Department of 
Water Resources to impose limitations on the Rights 
Holder’s pumping. In order to compensate for the lost 
water, Operator sought to pump water outside of its 
allotted ten-acre tract. However, the Director 
determined that the available water to all Rights 
Holders had gradually declined, and the Rights 
Holders were allocating their water without waste. 
On review, the Supreme Court of Idaho determined 
the Operator may only pump water from its 
designated tract, and the Rights Holders were 
permitted to continue pumping water. The Court also 
determined while the Operator asserted water rights 
to an entire spring, the Director was permitted to 
limit pumping from one mouth of the spring.  
 
 









DJL Farm LLC, et al. v. U.S. E.P.A., Nos. 15–2245, 
15–2246, 15–2247, 15–2248, 2016 WL 716185 (7th 
Cir. Feb. 23, 2016) 
 
Emission Mitigation Company (Company) applied for 
and was granted four permits by the EPA to construct 
and operate underground injection control wells. 
Company was to inject carbon dioxide into deep 
subsurface rock formations for storage designed to 
reduce carbon dioxide emissions while attempting to 
mitigate climate change. Farm, along with other 
landowners, challenged the permits and filed petitions 
for review with the EPA, which were denied by the 
Board. Upon denial by the Board, this Circuit began 
review. Because Company failed to obtain an 
extension from the EPA, both Company and the EPA 
moved to vacate oral arguments and dismiss the 
petitions for review as moot. The Circuit Court held 
that the issue was moot, because the permits were 
expired as of February 2, 2016, due to suspension of 
funding resulting from lack of progress in 
construction. The Circuit Court held that because the 
expired permits cannot be transferred, reissued, or 
used as a basis for issuing new permits in the same 
locations, both Company and the EPA have met the 
burden that the allegedly wrongful behavior could be 




Alaska Oil & Gas Ass’n. v. Jewell, Nos. 13–35619, 
13–35666, 13–35662, 13–35667, 13–35669, 2016 WL 
766855 (9th Cir. 2016). 
 
U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service (FWS) listed polar bears 
as threatened under the Endangered Species Act 
(ESA), and in accordance with the ESA, FWS 
designated habitat critical to the conservation of polar 
bears. Oil and Gas Trade Associations, several Alaska 
Native Corporations, and the State of Alaska 
(collectively, Interested Parties), brought suit against 
the FWS, challenging the habitat designation under the 
ESA and the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). 
Interested Parties claimed that the habitat designation 
was unjustifiably large, and that FWS failed to follow 
ESA procedure. The lower court granted summary 
judgment in favor of the Interested Parties. On appeal, 
the Ninth Circuit reversed the decision. The Circuit 
Court held that the standard that FWS followed in 
making the designation—looking to areas that 
contained constituent elements required for sustained 
preservation of polar bears—was in accordance with 
the statutory purpose. Additionally, the FWS 
designation was not arbitrary and capricious because 
the designation contained areas required protection for 
both birthing and acclimation of bear cubs, and the 
FWS provided explanation for its treatment of areas of 
known human habitation. Lastly, the Court stated that 
the plain text of the ESA indicates that consultation 
with the state is discretionary, not mandatory. 
 
Arizona ex rel. Darwin v. U.S. E.P.A., 81 ERC 2225 
(9th Cir. 2016). 
 
The EPA implemented a Final Rule, which partially 
disapproved of Arizona’s Clean Air Act regional haze 
State Implementation Plan (SIP) submission and 
instead led EPA to promulgate a Federal 
Implementation Plan (FIP) in response. The EPA 
concluded that Arizona’s best available retrofit 
technology (BART) determinations were deficient in 
three particular respects. First, EPA determined that 
Arizona’s control cost calculations were not 
performed in accordance with the Guidelines and were 
otherwise unreasonable. Second, that Arizona did not 
evaluate the visibility improvements to all Class I 
areas in the proper fashion, as required by EPA. 
Lastly, Arizona inadequately explained its 
consideration of the BART factors. As a result, EPA 
disapproved of Arizona’s BART determinations and 
promulgated an FIP with replacement determinations 
of nitrogen oxide limits. The Ninth Circuit held that 
the arbitrary and capricious standard applied to EPA’s 
determinations, and that EPA did not act arbitrarily or 
capriciously when EPA determined Arizona’s lack of 
compliance and implemented an FIP. 
 
Klamath-Siskiyou Wildlands Center. v. Gerritsma, No. 
13-35811, 2016 WL 775297 (9th Cir. Feb. 29, 2016). 
 
Wildland Centers brought suit against the United 
States Bureau of Land Management and field manager 
in his official capacity (collectively, BLM) under the 
Administrative Procedure Act alleging that the BLM 
violated the National Environmental Policy Act 
(NEPA) and the Federal Land Policy and Management 
Act (FLPMA) in its approval of a logging project 
(Project). Wildland Centers argued the BLM’s 
Environmental Assessment (EA) of the project failed 
to sufficiently comply with NEPA in its consideration 
of the impact the Project would have on the 
environment. Specifically, the Wildland Centers 
argued that the EA was insufficient for two reasons. 
http://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/onej/vol1/iss6/5
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First, the BLM failed to state the exact number and 
location of all infected trees to be removed. Second, 
the BLM failed to fully consider the environmental 
impact that may occur due to unauthorized off-
highway vehicle use facilitated by the Project’s 
requirement for new roads. Additionally, Wildland 
Centers argued the BLM failed to adhere to its 
FLPMA required land use plan by failing to comply 
with the plan’s prohibition on a decrease in soil 
productivity and a requirement for the preservation of 
fragile soils. These shortcomings were argued to 
render the BLM’s actions arbitrary and capricious. 
The lower court ruled in favor of the BLM on all 
claims. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the lower court’s 
decision. In determining that the EA sufficient under 
NEPA, the Ninth Circuit deferred to the BLM’s 
environmental impact estimate and its decision not to 
prepare an Environmental Impact Statement. 
Similarly, the court dismissed both FLPMA claims by 
giving deference to the BLM’s land use plan which, 
according to the court, did contemplate some decrease 
in soil productivity and carefully considered—but did 






Gulf Restoration Network v. Jewell, No. 15-00191-
CB-C, 2016 WL 617461 (S.D. Ala. Feb. 16, 2016). 
 
A non-profit, environmental organization (Plaintiff) 
filed suit against federal and state appointed Trustees 
who were designated to develop a plan to restore the 
natural habitat following the Deepwater Horizon oil 
spill in the Gulf of Mexico. Plaintiff challenged the 
agencies’ plan to use a portion of funds dedicated for 
early restoration of natural resources to partially fund 
a lodge and conference center in Alabama’s Gulf State 
Park. The District Court held that while the Trustees 
failed to consider reasonable alternatives to the 
proposed lease project, they did not act arbitrarily and 
capriciously in conducting their environmental impact 
statement pursuant to the Administrative Procedure 
Act. Further, the project did not violate the National 
Environmental Protection Act (NEPA) because only 
direct, not indirect effects of the proposed action must 
be studied. However, the court did decide to enjoin use 
of early restoration funds by the Trustees pending 




Bonnell v. Cotner, No. 66503-1509-PL-530, 2016 WL 
614107 (Ind. Feb. 16, 2016). 
 
Landowners filed suit to quiet title for land, asserting 
ownership of the disputed land by adverse possession. 
The State sold the land on two separate occasions by 
tax sales. The Supreme Court found that despite the 
landowners satisfying the four common law 
requirements for adverse possession—control, intent, 
notice, and duration—the landowners had not 
perfected their adverse possession claim because they 
had not paid property taxes on the disputed land. Due 
to Indiana Tax Deed Statutes mandating that the sale 
of any property by tax deeds severs all prior claims of 
ownership, including ownership by adverse 
possession, the Court held that the landowners were 
divested of any interest in the disputed land. Thus, the 
tax sales of the disputed land defeated the landowners’ 




Montana Environmental Information Center v. 
Montana Dept. of Environmental Quality, 2016 MT 9 
(Mont. 2016).  
 
State Environmental Information Center (Center) filed 
suit challenging the Department of Environmental 
Quality’s (DEQ) decision to approve the expansion of 
a gold mine to include a smaller nearby pit. Center 
argued that the DEQ’s plan to reclaim the nearby pit 
violated the Montana constitution because it did not 
require the expanding company to completely backfill 
the pit after closure. Center also contended that the 
DEQ’s decision to select the particular reclamation 
plan was arbitrary and capricious because the criteria 
set forth in the Montana Metal Mine Reclamation Act 
(MMRA) were not satisfied. The DEQ contended that 
Center was estopped from litigating its constitutional 
argument since the exact issue had been litigated in a 
prior proceeding, with Center obtaining an adverse 
judgment. The DEQ also maintained its reclamation 
plan was in compliance with MMRA requirements. 
The lower court ruled in favor of the DEQ. On appeal, 
the Supreme Court of Montana affirmed the lower 
court’s decision. The Court held that the Center was 
barred by issue preclusion from re-litigating its 
constitutional claim on the grounds that, while 
couched in different language, the constitutional 
standard it advocated in the present case was 
indistinguishable from the argumentative standard put 
forth in prior litigation. Moreover, the Court found no 
meaningful, legally significant difference between the 
issue in the present litigation and the factually similar 
issue in the previous case. Thus, the Court reaffirmed 
that the Montana constitution does not require land 
disturbed by the taking of natural resources to be fully 
reclaimed to its previous condition and held that the 
MMRA is constitutional. Additionally, the Court held 
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the DEQ’s reclamation plan was not arbitrary or 
capricious under the MMRA and was supported by 




Q-2 L.L.C. v. Hughes, 2016 UT 8 (Utah 2016). 
 
Landowners collectively brought a quiet title action 
against Neighbor under the theory of boundary by 
acquiescence. Neighbor counterclaimed for adverse 
possession of the disputed land. On review, the 
Supreme Court of Utah addressed: (1) how and when a 
party acquires title under the doctrine of boundary by 
acquiescence; and (2) whether title transfers by 
operation of law at the time elements of boundary by 
acquiescence are met or by judicial decree at the time 
the trial court enters its order. On the first issue, the 
Supreme Court reaffirmed and clarified the rule that 
title under the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence 
transfers by operation of law, not by judicial order. On 
the second issue, the Court held that the boundary by 
acquiescence doctrine grants title by operation when 
its elements are met, and judicial adjudication of a 
boundary dispute does not confer title but merely 




Wetlands America Trust, Inc. v. White Cloud Nine 
Ventures, L.P., 782 S.E.2d 131 (Va. 2016). 
 
Trust held a conservation easement and sought a 
declaratory judgment against Property Owner for 
allegedly violating the easement’s restrictive 
covenants. Trust asserted that Property Owner’s 
construction activities and intended commercial use of 
new facilities on the property violated the conservation 
easement. The trial court entered judgment in favor of 
Property Owner. Trust appealed. The Supreme Court 
of Virginia held that the farm construction was 
permitted on the property, that the grading of site for a 
parking area did not violate terms of the easement, and 
that prior written approval from the Trust was not 
needed. Also, because Property Owner’s construction 
and use of new facilities did not significantly interfere 
with easement’s conservation values or environment, 
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